Developments in recoverable damages for wrongful and unfair dismissal - the search for coherence

A number of decisions over recent years have affected both the heads of compensation that may be claimed in dismissal cases, and the jurisdiction in which they may be recovered. In this article, we put the spotlight on the current position regarding recoverable compensation at common law and under statute. We also outline possible future changes that might help solve the existing problems of clarity and coherence.

The dismissal compensation landscape is not a tidy one, and key issues concerning what is recoverable and where have yet to be definitively resolved.

Where statutory claims are concerned, the heads of damage that may be recovered as part of the compensatory award have been revisited in recent case law. Although apparently settled for now, the arguments raised in support of the resulting position are not entirely compelling, meaning that there may be scope for future challenge. Similarly, at common law, while it is seemingly trite law that compensation is limited to losses flowing from denial of the notice period (generally lost salary), the precise extent of the losses that may be recovered remains contentious.

The problems stem from the fabled decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys Ltd , and we therefore begin with an analysis of that decision. This is followed by an examination of its implications (as developed by later decisions of other courts) for common law and statutory awards, in that order.

Johnson emasculates the wrongful dismissal action

Long before the conception of either the statutory unfair dismissal remedy or the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, the House of Lords decided in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd that an individual dismissed in breach of the notice provisions of his or her contract of employment could not claim for injury to feelings or for damages in respect of the fact that the dismissal itself made it harder for him or her to obtain fresh employment. Rather, compensation was limited to a sum representing the lost wages and commission that the employee could have expected to receive during the notice period.

This rule was strictly adhered to for the best part of 90 years, until the House of Lords' decision in Malik and another v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA apparently departed from a rigid application of that part of the rule that denied compensation for being hampered in the labour market by reason of being dismissed. In Malik, the House of Lords explicitly confirmed the existence of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, and held that this was breached during the course of the employment relationship in that case by the employer's dishonest management of the company. In their Lordships' view, damages were recoverable for the "stigma" attached to the claimants as a result of having worked for the company, thereby compensating them for the handicap in the labour market with which their association with this corruption saddled them. Moreover, the fact that the employer's breach was not uncovered until after the claimants' employment had ended did not prevent them from making their claims.

This decision had the potential for opening up the common law wrongful dismissal action into a much more extensive and fruitful remedy than simply a means for obtaining due notice pay. Indeed, for those (high-earning) victims of psychiatric injury allegedly caused by their dismissal being conducted in a manner inconsistent with this new implied term of mutual trust and confidence, the wrongful dismissal action began to look like a mechanism for obtaining full compensation: the statutory cap on unfair dismissal compensation, and the fact that only economic losses were recoverable under statute (Norton Tool Co Ltd v Tewson), otherwise prevented this.

However, any such development of the common law in this manner was halted by the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys Ltd. Johnson held that the mutual trust and confidence term, as definitively established by Malik, could not be implied at the dismissal stage: it was a term concerned with the ongoing employment relationship rather than its termination. As a result, the claim for damages for psychiatric injury caused by the manner in which the claimant was dismissed was not founded upon any breach of contract (or duty of care in tort), and thus disclosed no cause of action. Similarly, there could be no claim in respect of injuries caused by the fact of having been dismissed in itself. Neither could there be any damages for injured feelings, mental distress or damage to reputation arising out of the manner of the dismissal, on the basis of Addis.

Although often now considered to be trite law, the precise effect of this decision is not as clear as is often assumed, as illustrated by the EAT's decision in Virgin Net v Harper.

Harper threatens it with extinction

Following Johnson's restriction of the wrongful dismissal action's development, the EAT's comments in the more recent case of Virgin Net v Harper, if agreed with by the higher courts, have the potential to kill it off altogether. Harper concerned a woman who had been dismissed in breach of her express contractual notice terms, in circumstances where allowing her to work out her contractual notice (in the absence of a clause entitling the employer to pay her in lieu) would have enabled her to accrue one year's continuous service for the purposes of bringing an unfair dismissal claim. Consequently, Ms Harper brought a wrongful dismissal action in which she sought to claim for the loss of the chance to bring an unfair dismissal claim.

The EAT allowed an appeal against the tribunal's finding that such a claim could be made, on the basis of statutory provisions (s.97(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996), which state that the effective date of termination ("EDT") for a summarily dismissed employee is extended only to the end of the statutory notice period to which they would be entitled, despite the existence of a longer contractual notice period. For Ms Harper, that extended her EDT only by one week, which still failed to give her the requisite length of continuous service to bring an unfair dismissal claim. The EAT concluded that she had not, therefore, lost the chance of bringing such a claim.

The EAT suggested obiter, however, that even if her EDT had been statutorily extended to a late enough date, her claim would still have failed on the basis of the ratio in Johnson. The EAT stated this to be, in our view with insufficient precision, that "an applicant cannot recover, by way of damages for breach of the contract of employment, loss flowing from the fact of and manner of the dismissal itself". Salary lost by virtue of having been dismissed without being allowed to work out one's contractual notice is a loss flowing from the fact of dismissal, hitherto compensatable by way of damages for the breach of the contract of employment that the summary dismissal constitutes (provided there is no payment-in-lieu-of-notice or "PILON" clause). So, if this view of Johnson becomes accepted, it will have consequences stretching far beyond preventing judicial development of the common law remedy - it will extinguish it as a cause of action. This is the widest possible interpretation of the ratio in Johnson, and hopefully, one that will not be approved.

Recoverable losses on different interpretations of Johnson

On the narrowest view, the ratio in Johnson denies claims for common law damages for psychiatric injury caused by the manner or fact of dismissal, on the basis that there is no breach of the duty of care or of contract (more specifically, the duty to take reasonable care for employees' health and safety or the implied term of mutual trust and confidence) by conducting dismissals in an injurious manner. Indeed, Mr Johnson's case was pleaded on the specific basis of a breach of the implied mutual trust and confidence term. It prevents recovery at common law for a particular kind of loss flowing from breach of a particular term, because that term cannot be implied at the dismissal stage.

However, Johnson need not necessarily prevent recovery for such losses sustained as a result of breach of different, express terms of the contract. If, for example, a claimant was able to prove that he or she had been so shocked by their dismissal in breach of notice terms (in the absence of any repudiatory conduct on their own part) that it had caused them psychiatric injury, it would be possible to raise an argument that a cause of action exists: the injury would be caused by the breach of notice terms, rather than a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The same would be true of dismissals in breach of contractual disciplinary procedures. The causation and remoteness hurdles might be very difficult to overcome in such cases. It would, of course, have to be shown that the employee's type of injury was, at the time the contract was made (Hadley v Baxendale), within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, as a not unlikely consequence of that breach (Walker v Northumberland County Council) - but the cause of action could exist in principle. This would not be inconsistent with Lord Steyn's view of the true ratio in Addis, that damages are recoverable only for loss caused by a breach of contract and not for loss caused by the manner of its breach. Neither would it be inconsistent with the more commonly received version of that ratio, that an employee cannot recover damages in respect of dismissal for injured feelings, mental distress or damage to reputation: the claim would be for a clinical psychiatric injury, which is of a seriousness surpassing mere distress or hurt feelings.

Further, this approach would not be prevented by the Court of Appeal's view in McCabe v Cornwall County Council that, according to Johnson, "there is no remedy at common law for any wrong justiciable under the employment legislation, that is, no overlap of jurisdiction." A claim for unfair dismissal and a claim for dismissal conducted in a manner inconsistent with mutual trust and confidence may or may not be two means of claiming for the same wrong (hence the refusal to imply that term in Johnson), but dismissal in breach of notice terms is undeniably a breach of contract, and is not therefore the same wrong as a statutorily unfair dismissal. Any such common law claim would simply be a straightforward wrongful dismissal claim, albeit for more extensive losses than the usual lost salary and benefits that would have been received during the notice period. In addition, if contractual disciplinary provisions are not followed, and following them would have kept the employee in employment longer than the notice period, damages for the lost salary between the end of the notice period and the likely conclusion of the disciplinary procedures should be recoverable (Gunton v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council).

However, other losses consequential upon having been denied employment for that time should also be recoverable. These would include the lost chance to bring an unfair dismissal claim by virtue of having been denied sufficient continuity of employment (provided the end of the employee's statutory notice period would take them over the one-year threshold - see our comment on Harper ), or by virtue of having been dismissed in breach of contractual disciplinary procedures, when following them would have kept the employee in employment long enough to accrue sufficient continuity (as in Raspin v United News Shops Ltd). This would present tribunals with no difficulty at all in cases where, as in Harper, it is found as a fact that the lost unfair dismissal claim would certainly have succeeded: the lost unfair dismissal compensation could simply be awarded as common law damages (subject to a £25,000 cap if awarded in an employment tribunal), and there would seem to be no reason why, as in Raspin, courts and tribunals could not adjust that part of the common law award representing the statutory compensation to reflect the percentage chance that the unfair dismissal claim would not have been successful.

It should also be noted at this point that the new statutory disciplinary procedures introduced by the Employment Act 2002 ("the EA"), which will have to be followed (when in force) before any dismissal is effected, will have an effect on Raspin-type claims, in that more favourable contractual disciplinary procedures are likely to become less common. Moreover, the government is not proposing to bring s.30 of the EA into force yet, meaning that the statutory procedures will not be implied into contracts of employment. Clearly, therefore, a Raspin-type claim based on a dismissal in breach of the statutory procedures will not be possible unless employers incorporate the statutory procedures into contracts of employment voluntarily. Of course, such claims will still be possible where there are more favourable contractual procedures and the employer has only complied with the minimum statutory requirements, thereby still committing a breach of contract. For a full examination of the statutory disciplinary procedures, see The Employment Act 2002 (2) .

Even where the dismissal is in breach of contractual disciplinary procedures (but is not in breach of notice provisions because of repudiatory conduct on the part of the employee or because of the existence of a PILON clause), and there is no loss of the right to claim unfair dismissal, employees would still be able to claim for salary during the period over which they should have remained employed for the disciplinary procedures to be carried out, on the basis of Gunton. However, it should be noted that, although applied with some reluctance by the Court of Appeal in Boyo v London Borough of Lambeth, the precise basis upon which damages for breach of contractual disciplinary procedures were awarded in Gunton remains unclear since, in that case, they were awarded even though the employer had at its disposal another express term enabling it to dispense with the procedure altogether and give one month's notice. This therefore remains a fragile line of authority until such time as it is approved by the House of Lords. Further, the terms of any such procedure itself will be important: they may provide that they need not be followed in cases of gross misconduct (for example), or that employees subject to the procedure will not be entitled to payment while it is being carried out.

On an intermediate view of the ratio in Johnson, it denies compensation for psychiatric injury resulting from the manner or fact of dismissal, regardless of whether there is a breach of contract or not. On this construction, the focus is purely on the type of loss that can be recovered at common law. Consequently, the means of recovering for psychiatric injury (described above) that may have survived Johnson, could not be available. If this view is correct, then no common law damages would be recoverable in respect of psychiatric injury caused by the fact of having been dismissed, the dismissal being carried out in a particularly distressing way (not itself a breach of contract), or the fact of having been dismissed in breach of express terms of the contract. However, this would not affect recovery at common law for the lost chance to claim unfair dismissal, or for losses of the type identified in Gunton, which would be denied if the wide view of Johnson expounded in Harper is accepted.

McCabe keeps breach of contract alive

Whichever of these views of the ratio in Johnson is the correct one, it is clear that only damages in respect of dismissal are affected. Following McCabe, claims for common law damages in respect of breaches of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence that occur during the course of the employment relationship do disclose a cause of action. In McCabe, the Court of Appeal held that a claim in respect of injury caused by the manner in which the employee was suspended and investigated prior to his dismissal could not be struck out. This was on the basis of a less restrictive reading of the Court of Appeal's conclusions in Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council than had been adopted in Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc.

In Gogay, a claim for damages for psychiatric injury caused by the manner of the employee's suspension and investigation was allowed, but there had been no dismissal. In Eastwood, the Court of Appeal took the view that, in light of Gogay, such claims could not be allowed to proceed where a dismissal had ultimately taken place. This view was disapproved in McCabe, where it was said that courts must look at whether, on the facts of each case, the complaint relates to the moment of dismissal or the events immediately surrounding it, or whether it relates to conduct of the employer prior to and separable from the act of dismissal itself.

While Johnson remains good law, McCabe represents an avenue for obtaining common law damages for psychiatric injury ostensibly flowing from the manner of dismissal. Succeeding with such claims will be a question of winning hard-fought battles to establish on the evidence that, even though the employee was eventually dismissed, the injury was nonetheless caused by conduct prior to that act. It remains to be seen, however, how narrow a view of the "act of dismissal" the courts will be prepared to take, and employers may limit the scope for arguing that the injury was caused by conduct prior to dismissal by dismissing at the earliest available opportunity. Although such a tactic may result in statutory unfair dismissal liability (see below), the prospect of more substantial personal injury compensation would be avoided.

Unfair dismissal: Dunnachie isolates those injured by manner of dismissal

Any unfair dismissal liability would be restricted, both by virtue of the cap on the level of the compensatory award that may be made (currently set at £53,500) and by the fact that compensation for unfair dismissal cannot be awarded in respect of non-economic losses. That this is indeed so was confirmed by the EAT in Dunnachie v Kingston Upon Hull City Council . In Dunnachie, the EAT approved the line taken in Norton Tool: there can be no compensation in a statutory unfair dismissal claim for injury to feelings, distress, anxiety, pain, suffering and loss of amenity or any other non-economic loss. It was clear that a number of employment tribunals had begun to make awards in respect of such losses since Johnson, on the basis of the comments made by Lord Hoffmann in that case to the effect that, although their Lordships were denying certain common law claims in respect of psychiatric injury arising out of dismissal, it remained possible for non-economic losses in such cases to be recovered as part of the statutory unfair dismissal compensation. The EAT in Dunnachie considered these remarks to be obiter, and therefore felt able to confirm the position established in Norton Tool.

However, the EAT also expressly confirmed that economic losses flowing from such injuries, such as a continued inability to work, will be recoverable as part of the unfair dismissal award. This means that while someone in Mr Johnson's position would still fail if they were to bring the same common law claim today, they could effectively bring it as an unfair dismissal claim (with the benefit that common law tests of foreseeability and remoteness would not be involved: Leonard v Strathclyde Buses), and what they would miss out on would be compensation for the full extent of their economic losses (should they extend beyond the level of the statutory cap) and any award for pain, suffering and loss of amenity that they would normally expect to receive in a common law personal injury action. Aside from leaving Mr Johnson short-changed still (to the tune of some £350,000), this creates an anomaly in that victims of personal injuries in any other circumstances are able to claim for their non-economic losses in the common law courts, but those who happen to be injured by the manner of their dismissal cannot claim for them at common law or under statute.

Constructive dismissals

Assuming that repudiatory conduct by the employer entitling the employee to resign and claim constructive dismissal is treated in the same way as a direct dismissal (so that injurious conduct prompting resignation constitutes the "manner" of the dismissal), the employee would need to choose between bringing a statutory claim for unfair constructive dismissal - in which they could expect only to recover their economic losses - and struggling on in employment, in order to bring a breach of contract claim which could compensate for non-economic losses. Staying on in employment would avoid the difficulty in court of proving that the illness was not caused by the act of "dismissal" itself (or rather, the repudiatory conduct prompting resignation), which would have to be overcome because of the decision in Johnson. This might enable recovery of non-economic losses, but it should be borne in mind that it would also limit the employee's economic losses as they would obviously continue to receive their salary. Being able to bring a common law claim in these circumstances would not necessarily lead to a higher level of compensation, and the employer might well seek to hamper the employee in this strategy in any event, by dismissing early on so as to make it appear probable that the injury was caused by the fact or manner of dismissal.

It seems more likely, however, that constructive dismissals would be treated differently from direct dismissals at common law: repudiatory conduct by the employer, such as a breach of mutual trust and confidence, is accepted by the employee's resignation. The breach occurs during the currency of the employment relationship, and whether or not the employee decides to stay or to resign is irrelevant for the purposes of establishing liability for breach of contract. Theoretically, the employee who resigns in response to the employer's conduct should be able to make a statutory unfair constructive dismissal claim (economic losses only), and a common law claim for breach of contract, which could include non-economic losses. Indeed, in light of this significant benefit of the common law claim, employees in such circumstances would be encouraged to resign as early as possible so as to avoid being directly dismissed by their employer, who would be seeking to show that the fact or manner of dismissal was the cause of injury and, therefore, any common law claim would be precluded by Johnson.

It would even be for the employer to show that the employee would benefit from double recovery in the event of both claims being successful: if the employer cannot show that the statutory compensatory award compensates for the same losses as any common law special damages, then the employee would be entitled to both (O'Laoire v Jackel International Ltd). Both claims would centre on establishing a repudiatory breach by the employer, and once decided upon in one forum, the parties would be issue estopped from contending otherwise in the other. There would be no cause of action estoppel, however, as one is statutory and the other is common law: the tests for establishing liability are entirely different, and the common law concept of repudiatory breach is relevant in the constructive dismissal claim only insofar as it is necessary to establish that the employee has actually been "dismissed".

It should be noted, however, that any such common law claim by an employee based on discriminatory repudiatory conduct (for example, sexual or racial harassment) would estop them from bringing an equivalent statutory discrimination claim in an employment tribunal, because of the application of the doctrine of cause of action estoppel to discrimination claims in Sheriff v Klyne Tugs (Lowesoft) Ltd. Indeed, careful consideration should be given to whether to bring such claims for injury caused by the employer's discriminatory conduct in the common law courts or in the employment tribunal: there is no cap on awards in discrimination claims, awards for non-economic loss are specifically provided for by the compensation provisions of the discrimination statutes, and the decision as to whether or not to resign will have no impact on the likelihood of establishing liability. It will be relevant only in assessing the extent of the employee's economic losses. Generally, a statutory discrimination claim would seem to be the preferable option.

The future - overturn Dunnachie . . .

It may be decided that the EAT was wrong in Dunnachie to deny any award for non-economic losses in statutory unfair dismissal compensation. There are grounds for so doing. First, it is not entirely clear that Lord Hoffmann's comments to the effect that non-economic losses should be available as unfair dismissal compensation, were necessarily obiter. His view on this point enabled his Lordship to reach the conclusion that all Mr Johnson's claims were justiciable in the employment tribunal and, therefore, arguably assisted him in deciding that parliament must have intended for the common law remedy to be restricted, and forthose complaining about their dismissal to bring statutory claims. His view that non-economic losses were available in tribunals also arguably formed part of his reasoning in denying recovery of them at common law.

Second, the arguments relied upon by the EAT in finding that tribunals should not be able to make awards for injury to feelings were not watertight. It was suggested that tribunals do not possess the expertise to make proper assessments of awards for non-economic losses, and that they might have difficulty in dealing with complex medical evidence. On the contrary, tribunals make awards for injury to feelings in discrimination cases as a matter of course, and regularly have to deal with medical evidence in disability discrimination cases.

Although these arguments can be raised in support of disapproving Dunnachie, their success would not perhaps aid coherence in the law. Injury to feelings awards in statutory claims would be decided on a discretionary basis, and might well not correlate with pain, suffering and loss of amenity ("PSLA") awards in an equivalent personal injury claim. It would be very difficult to prevent double recovery in respect of non-economic losses as tribunals would have to be able to separate out different sums for hurt feelings and actual injury, so that any court hearing a subsequent civil claim would be able to see what has been awarded under which head and thereby avoid repetition. This is not a problem that arises in discrimination cases because of the application of cause of action estoppel: either the tribunal makes an award for non-economic losses or a civil court does.Moreover, this dissection exercise would be a much more complicated (and ultimately artificial) task than separating out different heads of mathematically quantifiable financial losses, which is not even required to be done with a particularly high level of precision, in light of Leonard v Strathclyde Buses. Thus, it would perhaps be preferable for non-economic losses to remain outside the powers of employment tribunals in unfair dismissal cases.

. . . or overturn Johnson?

If Dunnachie is subsequently confirmed as correct in its restoration of the Norton Tool construction of the "just and equitable" award as a purely economic one, the anomalous position of employees injured by the manner of their dismissal not being able to claim for their non-economic losses in either the common law or statutory jurisdiction will need to be rectified. This should be possible without the intervention of parliament: the reasoning behind the decision in Johnson was not compelling, and is due to be reconsidered when the House of Lords considers the appeal from the Court of Appeal in Eastwood early in 2004.

The argument that the operation of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence could not be extended to the point of dismissal (because it is concerned with preserving the continuing employment relationship rather than its termination) can easily be criticised, as it was by Lord Steyn in his dissent on this reasoning. His view was the same as Lord Nicholls's had been in Malik, where he said that "now that this term exists and is normally implied into every contract of employment, damages for its breach should be assessed in accordance with ordinary contractual principles. This is as much true if the breach occurs before or in connection with dismissal as at any other time." Indeed, if the purpose of the term is to ensure fair dealing between employer and employee, then it is arguable that it takes on greatest significance at the point of dismissal, as that is the point at which the most serious exchanges between employer and employee take place. Moreover, if it is a term of the employment contract, it should create obligations for both parties for the duration of the period over which that relationship is subsisting. This continues until the point at which the termination is effected, so it seems arbitrary and anomalous that the term should not bite during the process of dismissal, before termination.

Their Lordships sought to answer this criticism by asserting that parliament, in creating a statutory right subject to strict limits, must have intended to prevent the development of a parallel common law remedy for the manner of dismissals (even if Addis could be departed from). It is by no means clear, however, why this should follow. The statutory remedy was created as a means of compensating employees dismissed for illegitimate reasons, or by means of an unfair procedure, for their lost redundancy rights, lost continuity of employment, and lost earnings during the period between dismissal and obtaining fresh employment. It has nothing to do with compensating those injured by the manner in which their dismissal is carried out. As already noted, however, Lord Hoffmann stated in comments subsequently identified as obiter by the EAT in Dunnachie, that the Norton Tool construction of "just and equitable" unfair dismissal compensation, restricting it to financial losses only, was "too narrow". The suggestion was that PSLA awards should be available as part of the unfair dismissal compensatory award. Consequently, the majority of the House of Lords took the view that everything Mr Johnson was claiming for fell within the jurisdiction of the employment tribunal. This being the case, parliament must have intended the claims to be dealt with there, and to prevent the development of a parallel common law remedy. Of special importance in this regard was the statutory cap on compensation. Their Lordships thought Mr Johnson could not be allowed to avoid this, as the parliamentary intention had been to limit the value of dismissal claims. This means that all highly paid employees have to accept as a risk inherent in their position that they will not necessarily receive full compensation for dismissal.

If the majority in Johnson had concluded that non-economic loss could not be claimed in an unfair dismissal action (as is currently the position in any event, after Dunnachie), a common law remedy through which this could be recovered would not have been parallel to that provided for by statute: the respective losses for which the two regimes would have been compensating would not have been the same, and the tests for liability would have been different. Both routes would have produced an element of compensation for loss of future earnings, but any recovered in one jurisdiction could simply have been deducted from any award made in the other, so as to prevent double recovery. If Johnson is overturned and Dunnachie approved, statutory unfair dismissal compensation would provide the basic award, and a compensatory award for economic losses (including those incurred as a result of a continued inability to work caused by injury sustained from the manner of dismissal), up to a maximum of the current statutory cap (£53,500). This compensatory award would generally not be calculated by reference to the Ogden Tables (see Dunnachie & Drage ), and injury to feelings would remain non-compensatable in statutory claims.

An injured employee in Mr Johnson's circumstances would then be able to bring a common law claim for his or her injuries, as part of which they would be able to claim for non-economic general damages for their psychiatric injury. There would be a risk that the special damages award would doubly compensate the employee who has already received a statutory compensatory award, and there would also be a potential problem in that common law special damages are calculated by reference to the Ogden Tables. These need not be considered insuperable difficulties, however: the court could simply assess what compensation would have been awarded in the absence of a statutory claim, and award only the difference (if any) between the statutory compensatory award and the amount of common law special damages. In the event that the former exceeds the latter, no special damages would be awarded. Indeed, such subtraction would only be necessary to the extent that the employer is able to establish any double recovery.

In this way (upholding Dunnachie and overturning Johnson), a welcome degree of coherence could be achieved between causes of action and awards of damages at common law and under statute. The decision of the House of Lords in Eastwood is therefore eagerly awaited.

Case list

Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488
Boyo v London Borough of Lambeth [1995] IRLR 50
Dunnachie v Kingston Upon Hull City Council [2003] IRLR 384
Dunnachie & Drage 30.07.03 EAT/0848/02/RN; 30.07.03 EAT/1036/02/RN
Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2002] IRLR 448
Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR 703
Gunton v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [1980] ICR 755
Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341
Johnson v Unisys [2001] IRLR 279
Leonard and others v Strathclyde Buses [1998] IRLR 693
Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] IRLR 462
McCabe v Cornwall County Council [2003] IRLR 87
Norton Tool Co Ltd v Tewson [1972] IRLR 86
O'Laoire v Jackel International Ltd (No.2) [1991] IRLR 170
Raspin v United News Shops Ltd [1999] IRLR 9
Sheriff v Klyne Tugs Ltd [1999] IRLR 481
Virgin Net Ltd v Harper 09.07.03 EAT/0111/02/RN
Walker v Northumberland County Council [1995] IRLR 35