Safety victimisation: the view from the tribunals
Industrial and Employment Appeal Tribunals are proving broadly sympathetic to employees victimised on health and safety grounds.
Written by Roger Walden. This is an updated and edited version of an article published in IRS's "Industrial Relations Law Bulletin" in 1996 (Victimisation on health and safety grounds ).
Protection against victimisation and dismissal on health and safety grounds was introduced in the UK as part of the implementation of the 1989 Framework Directive (No.89/391/EEC). The provisions were originally contained in the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act, which inserted the rights into the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 ((EP(C)A). This in turn was replaced by the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). The protection in the ERA underpins rights and duties found in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 19921 (MHSW Regulations), which implemented the bulk of the Framework. In this feature, we examine how these provisions have been interpreted and applied by industrial tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).
What is a "detriment"?
The ERA protects employees against detriment, dismissal and redundancy on prescribed health and safety grounds (see box). Sex and race discrimination case law indicates that the term "detriment" in s.44(1) of the ERA probably means no more than "putting the employee under a disadvantage" (Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah).
It applies to a detriment by "any act, or any deliberate failure to act", by the employer. This covers positive actions such as reprimands or disciplinary measures. In Barton v Wandsworth Council, for example, an industrial tribunal found that the temporary transfer of an employee to alternative work whilst investigating his conduct, as well as a subsequent suspension from work and disciplinary action (which culminated in a two-year final written warning), could all be "detriments" under s.44(1). Detriment also clearly covers a failure or omission to consider an employee for a pay rise, overtime working, promotion or any other benefit (whether contractual or otherwise), or the deliberate denial of benefits or advantages (including the opportunity to work) afforded to others.
Section 44(1) does not generally apply "where the detriment in question amounts to a dismissal" (this being covered by s.100). But in an important exception, it is expressly provided that a dismissal in the form of the expiry and non-renewal of a fixed-term contract for one year or more - under which the employee has agreed in writing to waive his or her statutory unfair dismissal rights - will be a "detriment" for present purposes (s.44(4)).
Constructive dismissal
Section 100 of the ERA applies to dismissals as defined in s.95(1), ie express dismissals by an employer, with or without notice (s.95(1)(a)); the expiry and non-renewal of a fixed-term contract (s.95(1)(b) - subject to the exception above); and "constructive" dismissals, whereby an employee terminates the contract, with or without notice, in response to a fundamental or repudiatory breach of contract by the employer (s.95(1)(c)).
An industrial tribunal's decision in Baddeley v Balraj Mehta t/a Supascoop , however, raises questions about the proper application of s.100 in constructive dismissal cases. Ms Baddeley complained to her employer that she was required to perform duties (in particular, carrying bulky produce) beyond her physical capacity - she was only 19 and relatively small and slightly built - which caused her both physical and mental stress. She eventually resigned and complained of automatically unfair constructive dismissal under s.100. The tribunal found that if Ms Baddeley had complained to her employer that it was in breach of health and safety requirements, or was causing her to do something which was harmful to her health and safety, and she had been dismissed in consequence, she would have had the right to complain under s.100(1)(c).
But any attempt to extend the protection afforded by s.100 to those complaining of constructive dismissal would, said the tribunal, be "fraught with difficulties". Whilst an employee, who had action taken against her by her employer, which amounted to a fundamental breach of contract, because of her involvement in a protected health and safety matter, might succeed in complaining of automatically unfair constructive dismissal if she resigned in consequence rather than relying on s.44, the same could not be said of an employee who resigned simply because the employer ignored her complaint. If Parliament had intended such a "startlingly novel" right, it would have spelled this out in the section. The right to complain under s.100 "arises only when the employer dismisses the employee under s.95(1)(a) or (b) [of the ERA] or fundamentally breaches the employee's contract as a punishment for the employee's health and safety activity, entitling the employee to resign and rely on s.95(1)(c). It does not arise where the only action of the employer about which complaint is made is the health and safety breach itself," the tribunal concluded.
Even if the tribunal's reasoning in Baddeley is in principle correct, the decision may not be too restrictive. It has been established for some time that, as part of their general contractual duty of care for employees' health and safety, employers are under an obligation to act reasonably in dealing with matters of safety, or complaints of lack of safety, which are drawn to their attention by those employees (British Aircraft Corporation v Austin). Unless such a complaint is obviously "not bona fide or is frivolous", an employer can only discharge its duty by investigating the matter "promptly and sensibly". A failure to do so will normally amount to a repudiatory breach of an essential contractual term.
It might also be argued that an employer's persistent failure or refusal to deal with the issue amounts in itself to a "detriment" or punishment (under s.44) imposed on the grounds of the employee's attempts to raise health and safety concerns. In these circumstances, there would seem to be no logical reason to preclude the employee from resigning and relying on s.100.
Protection of representatives
Those provisions of ss.44 and 100 which protect, amongst others, employees with designated health and safety duties, and representatives of workers on health and safety matters (categories 1 and 2 in the box below), apply to competent persons appointed by employers under the MHSW Regulations; health and safety representatives or committee members appointed by trade unions under the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 19772; elected representatives of employee safety under the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996; and safety representatives designated, or acknowledged as such, by an employer. They also cover employees who are safety representatives or members of safety committees under the Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 19893.
If such an employee is dismissed or subjected to a detriment because he or she has carried out, or proposes to carry out, a function of a designated person or safety representative, it appears that it is no defence for the employer to argue that the representative "intended to embarrass the company in front of the external safety authorities, or that he [or she] performed those functions in an unreasonable way, unacceptable to the employer" (see the EAT's recent decision in Shillito v Van Leer (UK) Ltd). The EAT in Shillito added, however, that this will not be the case if the employee's "purpose was not to pursue a genuine health and safety matter … but to pursue a personal agenda to embarrass the [employer]". This raises difficult evidential questions of motive and purpose, and will be especially problematic where there is evidence that the employee has "mixed motives".
More recently, the EAT in Goodwin v Cabletel UK Ltd confirmed that "the protection afforded to the way in which a designated employee carries out his health and safety activities must not be diluted by too easily finding acts done for that purpose to be a justification for dismissal; on the other hand not every act, however malicious or irrelevant to the task in hand, must necessarily be treated as a protected act in circumstances where dismissal would be justified on legitimate grounds."
On the facts of the case, the EAT in Goodwin nevertheless found that an industrial tribunal had improperly sought to exclude consideration of the employer's reaction to the "uncompromising" manner in which a manager carried out his health and safety duties vis-à-vis a sub-contractor whom he believed to be in consistent breach of safety regulations and wished to remove from the site. There was a "clash of philosophies" with senior management - which wanted to adopt a more "conciliatory" and supportive approach in respect of the sub-contractor's admitted failures - and the proper question for the tribunal was whether the manner in which the employee approached the problem took him outside the scope of health and safety activities. The EAT hinted that in the circumstances such a finding would be "surprising".
It thus seems that tribunals are willing to draw fairly broad inferences as to the employer's reason for the dismissal or detriment. In McEvoy and others v Mercury Communications Ltd, for example, a tribunal concluded that an employee had been automatically unfairly selected for redundancy because of his activities as an employer-designated "health and safety coordinator". The tribunal was impressed by evidence that a manager who was integrally involved in the redundancy process was unduly hostile to the employee's activities and, in particular, had been concerned by an incident in which the employee had identified asbestos on a site. This had ultimately resulted in the employer being fined £6,000 for breach of health and safety duties, and adverse publicity.
And in Burt v Patrington Haven Leisure Park, the EAT asked an industrial tribunal to look again at the case of a swimming pool attendant who closed a pool down because he believed its chlorine level was too low. The attendant was dismissed, but claimed he was carrying out duties as a person designated by the employer as responsible for the health and safety of the swimmers (for the purposes of ss.44(1)(a) or 100(1)(a)). (Note that, in contrast, the EAT upheld the tribunal's alternative conclusion that closing the pool was not "appropriate" action in the face of serious and imminent danger. In the industrial tribunal's view, the employee should have at least attempted to contact his superior about the problem, and only exercised his own discretion if the superior was unavailable or refused to act.)
Employee grievances
The extent to which employees are generally protected when they seek to raise health and safety problems or grievances with their employers depends largely on the approach taken to the wording of ss.44(1)(c) and 100(1)(c) of the ERA (category 4 in the box). Tribunals will, as the statute requires, limit these provisions to situations where there is no health and safety representative or safety committee, or where there is such a representative or committee but it was not reasonably practicable for the employee to raise the matter by those means. Employees must therefore follow appropriate procedures and raise matters through appropriate channels where these exist.
Thus, in Leake v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue, the employee helped raise a petition to her employer complaining about the ventilation system in her office. But the tribunal rejected her unfair dismissal complaint based on s.100(1)(c) because there was no evidence to suggest that it was not reasonably practicable to raise the matter through her office safety representative.
Similarly, in Barton, the employee fell outside s.44(1)(c) because the tribunal found that there were safety bodies at his employer's organisation to which he could have complained. Although there was evidence that he had attempted to do this, the tribunal felt he could have done a great deal more. Since the problems about which he had persistently complained to managers (in particular, the lack of experience and training of staff who accompanied often severely disabled patients in ambulances driven by the employee) were "ongoing", he could reasonably have taken them up more extensively with his representative.
But, as this case also demonstrates, if the danger to health and safety is sufficiently serious, an employee in Mr Barton's position may alternatively argue that he has taken "appropriate steps" to protect himself or others under the provisions of ss.44(1)(e) and 100(1)(e) (category 6 in the box). Safety representatives, designated persons and members of safety committees have additional protection if they raise concerns as part of their health and safety duties.
In any event, where there are no safety representatives or committees, or it is not reasonably practicable to use those channels, it will not necessarily be unreasonable under ss.44(1)(c) or 100(c) for an employee to warn the employer that, unless remedial action is taken, he or she will leaflet colleagues about the health risk of, for example, solder fumes and ask whether they have noticed any negative effects from the inhalation of such fumes. In Tedeschi v Hosiden Besson Ltd, the EAT accordingly commented that a leaflet of this type had not been couched in inflammatory language and, "the fact that a person entertains a belief so strongly that he wishes to protect his fellow employees as well as himself, or that he takes the matter so seriously that he wishes to investigate whether what he believes to be his own symptoms are shared by others or not, seems to show first of all that his belief was indeed a genuine one, and secondly, insofar as canvassing the extent to which other people have the same symptoms, it tends to show the reasonableness [of his actions]."
Reasonable means
As Tedeschi indicates, employees raising grievances under these provisions must have a "reasonable belief" in harm, and matters must be "brought to the employer's attention" by "reasonable means". The means may be direct or indirect, but they must always be "reasonable". A grievance may be raised orally (for example, face-to-face or over the telephone) or in writing (Brendon v BNFL Fluorochemicals Ltd).
Some tribunals have indicated that it would not normally be reasonable for an employee, for example, to go "over everybody's head" within the organisation, and raise the matter immediately and directly with an external body such as the HSE (see Crew v Portven Ltd, where the tribunal also questioned whether the employee had raised a grievance with his or her employer at all in these circumstances).
On the other hand, in Harris v Select Timber Frame Ltd (HSIB 222), an employee initially raised his grievance by showing a health and safety video to a company director. The employee also complained to the HSE, which visited the company and arranged for him to have a medical examination. A tribunal held that his subsequent dismissal was unfair under s.100(1)(c) as it was prompted by his safety complaints (including that to the HSE), and in particular the forthcoming medical examination, "coupled as it was with the threat of litigation".
But it seems unlikely that these provisions, in themselves, extend to persistently raising concerns about the possible end-use of the employer's products. In particular, an employee must be wary of devoting undue time and attention to such matters, at least to the extent that his or her work suffers or efficiency is undermined (Brendon). But if a threat to health and safety is sufficiently serious and "imminent" (including a serious continuing danger), or is reasonably believed to be so, an employee may be able to justify taking such action or "blowing the whistle" to an appropriate outside agency under ss.44(1)(e) or ss.100(1)(e). These might arguably be regarded as "appropriate steps" taken by the employee "to protect himself or others from the danger".
Harm to health and safety
A grievance within ss.44(1)(c) or 100(1)(c) must relate to "circumstances connected with his [or her] work" which the employee "reasonably believed were harmful or potentially harmful to health and safety."
For example, in Winters v Main Aspects Ltd t/a Mid-Transport Services, an experienced heavy goods vehicle (HGV) driver reported defects on the lorries he had to drive. These included a clutch which was slipping, difficulties in engaging gears and a prop-shaft that sheered off as he tried to rejoin a motorway. The employee was dismissed two days after the last of these incidents. Upholding his unfair dismissal complaint under s.100(1)(c), the tribunal found that all of these matters related to health and safety. It was important that vehicles, particularly HGVs, should be in a "roadworthy" condition. Since the employer had not given the employee any reason for his dismissal and the evidence indicated that the employee was competent in his work, the tribunal concluded that on the balance of probabilities the true reason for his dismissal was his health and safety complaints.
Other cases have involved defective doors on a lorry trailer (Hitt v Lightning Despatch Ltd); concerns about spraying and working on cars without adequate safety equipment (Malik v Dhanjal); the safety of plant and machinery and an employee's expressed intention to claim compensation for personal injury (Allen v Malbern UPVC Windows & Doors Ltd); and concerns about threats of, and actual, violence by work colleagues (Lopez v Maison Bouquillon Ltd - indeed, the employee here phoned her employer to say that she was leaving the workplace after being assaulted by a colleague and that she would report the matter to the police. The tribunal's decision in her favour indicates that her actions fell within both the grievance provisions and the serious and imminent danger provisions considered below).
"Reasonable belief"
Guidance on what is a reasonable belief was given by the EAT in Kerr v Nathan's Wastesavers Ltd . Mr Kerr was dismissed after he had expressed grave concern about the prospect of driving a vehicle which he estimated would be overloaded by the time he finished his waste-collection round. An industrial tribunal said that Mr Kerr had to show that:
Applying that test, the tribunal accepted that Mr Kerr had honestly believed that the overloading of vehicles was potentially harmful to safety, and that he had brought this concern to his employer's attention by reasonable means (the tribunal did not therefore find that his actions amounted to an outright refusal to work). But, the tribunal continued, he did not have reasonable grounds for his belief. In particular, he had not taken account of an established practice by which drivers could telephone for assistance or return to the depot as soon as they thought that their vehicle had reach its maximum permitted load.
Rejecting Mr Kerr's appeal, the EAT said that the tribunal had directed itself correctly on the law and the matters to be considered under s.100(1)(c). But this endorsement was qualified by a general warning that "care should be taken not to place an onerous duty of enquiry on an employee in a case such as this. The purpose of the legislation is to protect employees who raise matters of safety about which they are concerned; and the fact that the concern might be allayed by further enquiry need not mean that it is not reasonable."
Serious and imminent danger
Similar considerations accordingly apply to those subsections designed to protect employees who leave the workplace, refuse to return to work, or take other appropriate steps "in circumstances of danger which [they] reasonably believed to be serious and imminent" (categories 5 and 6 in the box). Indeed, the EAT in Kerr observed that if Mr Kerr had undertaken his collection round and been dismissed on either telephoning for assistance or returning to the depot with a part load, he would have had "an unanswerable case under s.100(1)(d)". The crucial issues to be decided under these provisions are, therefore, what amounts to "serious and imminent danger", and whether the employee's belief in such danger was "reasonable".
In Rawlings v Barraclough t/a Independent Delivery Services Ltd, Mr Rawlings was dismissed because of his persistent refusal to drive a particular van. He had discovered a hole and general rust and rot in the floor of the vehicle which, in his view, rendered it a serious danger to health and safety. His employer replied that the vehicle had been "looked at and was in a safe condition". At an industrial tribunal hearing into Mr Rawlings's unfair dismissal complaint, the employer argued that there was no evidence to suggest that corrosion was an "imminent" danger, and the fact that the vehicle had been checked, and that information relayed to Mr Rawlings, must have destroyed any reasonable belief which he had held about the danger.
The tribunal found that Mr Rawlings personally thought there was serious danger, namely that the condition of the van was such that the driver's seat "could at any time go through the floor", and that the rocking or potential rocking of the seat could cause him to lose control of the vehicle. During the period of his refusal to drive the van, Mr Rawlings had not had the benefit of any expert advice and it seemed to the tribunal that "s.100(1)(d) is to some extent a subjective test as to what the applicant believed the situation to be but against that there must be some degree of objectivity and some prima facie evidence of imminent and serious danger."
Expert evidence before the tribunal indicated that the vehicle in question would have failed an MOT test and was thus unroadworthy under the rules and regulations governing vehicle safety. In those circumstances, the tribunal felt that it could not take a contrary view. Furthermore, the assurance about the vehicle's safety which the employer had given to Mr Rawlings "was so informal and so undetailed that [he] was still entitled to hold his belief notwithstanding the fact that others had driven the van in the meantime."
In Roberts v EE Green Ltd, an employee was found to have been unfairly dismissed under s.100(1)(d) when he refused to comply with his employer's instruction to clean a chemical portaloo. He had heard that the toilets had not been cleaned or used for some considerable time, and that they were in an unhealthy state. After seeking advice from someone who worked for a specialist portaloo company, the employee told his employer that he would not clean the toilets without proper safety equipment and clear guidance. An industrial tribunal found that in these circumstances, "it was perfectly reasonable for [the employee] to consider … that his health would be at risk to such a serious extent that he should not proceed to carry out [his employer's request]." The tribunal observed that it would have been open to the employer to seek to reassure the employee by making appropriate enquiries about any health risk with local environmental health officers or the HSE, and providing the appropriate safety equipment.
In contrast, in Moon v Selby, a nursery nurse at a privately-run nursery school expressed concern to the local authority over safety standards at the school - particularly fire hazards and staff-pupil ratios. Remitting her unfair dismissal complaint under s.100(1)(e) to the industrial tribunal, the EAT pointed out that it is not enough for there to be a danger to health and safety, but that the danger must be reasonably believed to be serious and imminent. It was, said the EAT, difficult to see that the staff-pupil ratio could of itself give rise to such a danger, unless there had recently been a significant change in the numbers. Furthermore, the concerns expressed by the nurse were qualified, and took the form of an enquiry as to whether or not the establishment was being conducted safely. She did not appear to have formed a firm belief on this question.
Persistent or continuing danger
"Serious and imminent" danger is not, however, limited to single or one-off catastrophic events which cause obvious harm. In Barton, for example, Mr Barton was employed by Wandsworth Council as an ambulance driver, transporting patients with mental and physical disabilities to and from council day-care facilities. He persistently confronted the manager of one of these facilities with his concerns about the lack of experience and training of "escorts" - who accompanied patients in transit, and were responsible for their general welfare - and the unsafe use of the "tail-lifts" which lifted wheelchair-bound patients on and off the ambulance. As a result, he was transferred to work on other routes, suspended and ultimately disciplined.
He complained under s.44(1)(e), and an industrial tribunal found his belief that there was serious and imminent danger was reasonable. There had previously been accidents (including fatalities), and the danger to patients was "ongoing". Although the matters raised by Mr Barton were being discussed within council consultative committees, nothing had been done. Indeed, the situation had been sufficiently serious to warrant concern from the HSE.
The tribunal also had "no hesitation" in finding that the continued use of untrained escorts, with potentially serious consequences, could be described objectively as "circumstances of danger" within s.44(1)(e). Those words do not, it said, just refer to a single situation which is about to happen. There is no reason why they cannot apply "to a dangerous situation that had been going on for some time". A dangerous situation is not one that is causing harm to somebody all the time, but rather one "that has within it features which at any moment could give rise to active serious harm because of exposure to dangerous matters." If, for instance, an electricity company laid an unprotected high-voltage cable in the middle of a highly populated area, the fact that it had been there for many months without anybody touching it would not prevent it from being a circumstance of danger.
The tribunal therefore concluded that Mr Barton had suffered a detriment on the ground that he had taken appropriate steps by raising matters to protect himself or others (the patients) in the face of serious and imminent danger. It rejected the council's argument that he had been disciplined primarily because of the allegedly aggressive "manner", and not the substance, of his complaints.
Characteristics of employee
Tribunals may also take into account the particular characteristics of an employee in determining whether he or she had a reasonable belief in serious and imminent danger.
For example, in Clark v Falkirk Sunbed Solarium & Ladies Health Club Ltd, a young, slightly built and inexperienced female employee was required to deposit rubbish in bins situated in an unlocked and unlit garage over 100 yards from her employer's premises. Access to the garage was by way of an alley and a bus depot. This area was frequented by people attending a nearby nightclub and, occasionally, by gangs of youths. Ms Clark indicated that she was concerned about her safety, and asked to be accompanied by another member of staff or at least kept under supervision. She made similar requests on subsequent occasions, until she was dismissed after being told by her manager that he was "not employing two people to do one job".
Upholding her complaint under s.100(1)(e), an industrial tribunal found that, in the circumstances, she had a reasonable apprehension of danger. "Such is the tenor of modern life," said the tribunal, "that every possible reasonable protection should be made for the safety of young girls in employment, particularly where that employment environment impinges on public places which are neither well lit nor secure." Her request had not been unreasonable, she had not refused outright to comply with her employer's instruction, and it did not matter that a mature employee of "considerably more experience" had felt that there was minimal danger.
Sympathetic approach apparent
The tribunals and the EAT are developing an approach to ss.44 and 100 which is broadly sympathetic both to employees' concerns and the protective purposes of the legislation, whilst being astute to "weed out" unmeritorious complaints. To this extent, it is important that there has been a recognition of the need on occasion for employees to pursue health and safety matters vigorously, even if this is not necessarily to the employer's taste (Shillito and Goodwin, for example). And the comments in Kerr - to the effect that employees should not be placed under too onerous a duty when seeking to establish their rights and reasonable beliefs under the serious and imminent danger provisions - can only be welcomed as a positive contribution towards achieving safer working environments.
Safety victimisation - the protected grounds
Section 44 of the ERA provides that "an employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his [or her] employer" on specified health and safety grounds ("the protected grounds")4. Under s.100 of the Act, a dismissal will be automatically unfair if the reason or principal reason for dismissal falls within the protected grounds. Similarly, an employee's selection for redundancy will be automatically unfair if the reason, or principal reason, for selection was one of the protected grounds (s.105 of the ERA).
The protected grounds are that the employee:
1.has been "designated by the employer to carry out activities in connection with preventing or reducing risks to health and safety at work", and he or she carried out, or proposed to carry out, any of those activities (ss.44(1)(a) and 100(1)(a));
2.is a representative of employees on matters of health and safety at work or a member of a safety committee in accordance with arrangements established under any enactment, or by reason of the employer's acknowledgement, and he or she performed, or proposed to perform, any of his or her functions in that capacity (ss.44(1)(b) and 100(1)(b));
3.took part (or proposed to take part) in consultations with the employer pursuant to the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 19965 or in the election of representatives of employee safety within the meaning of those Regulations (whether as a candidate or otherwise) (ss.44(1)(ba) and 100(1)(ba));
4.has brought to his or her employer's attention, by reasonable means, circumstances connected with his or her work which he or she "reasonably believed were harmful or potentially harmful to health and safety" (ss.44(1)(c) and 100(1)(c)). This protection, however, applies only to employees at a place where there is no health and safety representative or safety committee, or where there is such a representative or committee but it was not reasonably practicable for the employee to raise the matter by those means;
5.left, or proposed to leave, his or her place of work or any dangerous part of the workplace, in circumstances of danger which he or she "reasonably believed to be serious and imminent" and which the employee could not reasonably have been expected to avert, or (while the danger persisted) refused to return to the workplace or any dangerous part thereof (ss.44(1)(d) and 100(1)(d)); or
6.took, or proposed to take, "appropriate steps" to protect himself or herself or other persons in circumstances of danger which he or she reasonably believed to be serious and imminent (ss.44(1)(e) and 100(1)(e)). Whether those steps were "appropriate" is to be judged by reference to all the circumstances including, in particular, the employee's knowledge and the facilities and advice available to him or her at the time (s.44(2) and 100(2)). An employer will have a defence under this provision if it can show that it was, or would have been, so negligent for the employee to take the steps which he or she took, or proposed to take, that a "reasonable employer" might have treated the employee as the employer did (ss.44(3) and 100(3)).
Case list
Allen v Malbern UPVC Windows & Doors Ltd 9.1.97 COIT 2401155/96
Baddeley v Balraj Mehta t/a Supascoop 6.1.95 COIT 46041/94
Barton v Wandsworth Council 12.7.95 COIT 11268/94
British Aircraft Corporation v Austin [1978] IRLR 332
Brendon v BNFL Fluorochemicals Ltd 2.8.96 EAT 766/95
Burt v Patrington Haven Leisure Park 28.4.97 EAT 424/96
Clark v Falkirk Sunbed Solarium & Ladies Health Club Ltd 8.2.95 (S)COIT S/505794
Crew v Portven Ltd 13.7.95 COIT 63784/94
Goodwin v Cabletel 24.7.97 EAT 95/96
Harris v Select Timber Frame Ltd 14.3.94 COIT 59214/93
Hitt v Lightning Despatch Ltd 24.2.97 EAT 210/97
Kerr v Nathan's Wastesavers Ltd 27.6.95 EAT 91/95
Leake v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue 27.1.95 COIT 16889/94
Lopez v Maison Bouquillon Ltd 10.5.96 COIT 57995/95
McEvoy and others v Mercury Communications Ltd 19.6.96 COIT 25165/95
Malik v Dhanjal 8.1.97 COIT 2600024/96
Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1979] IRLR 436
Moon v Selby 20.11.96 EAT 264/96
Rawlings v Barraclough t/a Independent Delivery Services Ltd 2.5.95 COIT 60178/93
Roberts v EE Green Ltd 7.7.95 COIT 15595/95
Shillito v Van Leer (UK) Ltd [1997] IRLR 495
Tedeschi v Hosiden Besson Ltd 16.10.96 EAT 959/95
Winters v Main Aspects Ltd t/a Mid-Transport Services 31.10.94 COIT 42114/94
1 SI 1992 No.2051.
2 SI 1977 No.500.
3 SI 1989 No.971.
4 There are no qualifying conditions for protection under any of these provisions. They cover all "employees" employed under contracts of service or apprenticeship, irrespective of age, hours of work or length of service. Questions of burden of proof, time limits for complaints and remedies are covered in HSIB 211 pp.11-14.
5 SI 1996 No.1513 .
