Trainees
An overview of the special employment law considerations applying to trainee workers.
Intensifying global competition and rapid technological change have served to emphasise the vital need for a trained and skilled workforce to ensure the United Kingdom's economic performance. Government-led reforms and initiatives in this area have led to a succession of work-based training and vocational education schemes for the young and the unemployed, many of which have relied for their success upon the participation and support of employers (see box).
Most training schemes for younger people are intended to bridge the gap between school and work by offering a work-based learning route into a career or full-time job after qualification. They nevertheless operate within the existing framework of industrial relations and employment law, an important feature of which is the core of employment protection rights established by the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the ERA) and other statutes which are available only to "employees" as defined.
In addition, numerous implied contractual obligations are imposed on the employer-employee relationship, such as the employer's personal, non-delegable duty of care towards its employees.
Note that trainees without "employee" status are not entirely without legally enforceable rights. In most cases they are covered by certain minimum terms and conditions imposed by the TECs on training providers and sub-contractors. These include obligations as to the quality of training; the payment of an allowance; the provision of guidance, counselling and assessment; the health, safety and welfare of the trainee; equality of opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment; supervision from experienced staff; and a clear written statement of terms and conditions.
However, these terms and conditions fall short of full statutory employment protection in many respects, and are generally enforceable only by way of actions for breach of contract in the ordinary courts.
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
The issue of employment status has most frequently arisen in the courts in the context of the distinction between employees and self-employed workers. Little assistance can be derived from the statutory definitions - in s.230(1) of the ERA of "employee" (individual who has entered into or works under ... a contract of employment"), or of a "contract of employment" ("a contract of service or apprenticeship"). The courts have therefore developed various criteria and tests to be applied to the determination of an individual's status. Similar considerations are applied to the question of whether or not a trainee has employed status.
The approach of a court or tribunal is likely to be to consider first whether or not there is any kind of contract in existence at all. If so, is the contract one of traineeship, one of employment or some other type of contract? Only if the contract is held to be one of employment will the trainee be an "employee" for the purposes of the employment protection legislation.
"Primary purpose" test
In cases of trainee workers, the courts tend to apply the "primary purpose" test to establish whether a contract is one of traineeship or one of employment (Wiltshire Police Authority v Wynn). If the primary purpose of the contract was "work for the master", with training being only a secondary purpose, the contract is one of employment. But if the primary purpose of the parties was the provision of a specific period of planned work experience and training, and work for the employer is only secondary, the contract is one of training. Applying this test in Wynn, the Court of Appeal held that a police cadet was a trainee and did not have a contract of employment.
Similarly, in Daley v Allied Suppliers Ltd, the EAT ruled that a person taking part in a work experience scheme as part of a Youth Opportunities Programme organised by the Manpower Services Commission had no contract of any kind with the company which had undertaken to provide her with experience. Alternatively, even if there was a contract, it was a contract for training rather than one of employment because "the underlying purpose of any contract between them was not to establish a relationship of an employer and employee but to enable [Ms Daley] to acquire certain skills and experience." In contrast, in Oliver v JP Malnick & Co, the EAT held that a solicitor's articled clerk had a training contract with the individual solicitor training her as well as a contract of employment with the firm itself.
The courts generally pay little regard to the label placed upon the relationship as evidence of the parties' contractual intent. Any decision will be based on the realities and all the circumstances of the relationship, rather than its appearance. A court or tribunal must look beneath the label to the facts of the matter, and to decide on all the evidence whether the true legal relationship accords with the label or is contradicted by it (Young & Woods Ltd v West).
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) require that a trainee's status should be clarified by a training provider at the onset of a programme of training. But it follows from the foregoing that a clearly-expressed contractual statement to the effect that a trainee is being taken on as an employee, as a trainee, or as a self-employed person, although carrying some weight, will not preclude a court from examining the true nature of the relationship.
Change in status
It may be possible for the parties to agree to a change in status from trainee to "employee" during the course of the traineeship. In Massey v Crown Life Insurance Co, the Court of Appeal took the view that the courts should give effect to a genuine intention to change status, particularly where the change had in fact taken place and where the pre-existing situation was one of doubt or ambiguity.
The question arises, however, whether a change in status can be taken to have occurred automatically where an employer provides a trainee with terms and conditions which exceed the minimum set by the TEC such that the new terms are close to or identical with the terms and conditions of the regular workforce. It is clear from the Court of Appeal decision in O'Kelly and others v Trusthouse Forte plc that the fact that workers are engaged on terms similar to those of the regular workforce does not of itself crystallise their position into one of employment.
In Lymbury t/a John Lymbury & Co, a solicitors' firm engaged Ms McCrery on a training contract from 1 October 1993. That contract lasted for two years, at the end of which she was admitted to the roll. She remained with the firm as an assistant solicitor until her dismissal in June 1997. On her complaint of unfair dismissal, the industrial tribunal held that Ms McCrery had been continuously employed since 1 October 1993, and so it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The EAT dismissed the firm's appeal, holding that the purpose of the training contract was two-fold: to provide training to the would-be solicitor and to create a fixed-term contract of employment. When Ms McCrery was offered fresh terms as an assistant solicitor, so that her employment continued without interruption, the presumption of continuity in s.210(5) of the ERA was not rebutted.
"In-built" employee status
Some modern training programmes purport to incorporate employee status as a built-in feature, and insist that participating employers grant employee status to trainees. This has been the case with Modern Apprenticeships (see box) where almost all schemes offer their apprentices employee status. Similarly, one of the features of National Traineeships (see box) is that participants should have employee status.
By virtue of s.26 of the Employment Act 1988, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment has the power to specify whether or not trainees are being "employed" and, if so, whether they are to be treated as "employees" of the persons specified.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Where non-employed trainees are covered by the TEC terms and conditions, their training agreement is required to set out matters such as hours of work, entitlement to holidays, paid time off and trade union membership. Trainees should be given copies of, or have access to, the procedures to be followed in case of sickness, when a grievance or disciplinary matter arises, or upon termination of the agreement.
Employed trainees are covered by their contractual terms and conditions of employment, and are entitled to receive a statement of employment particulars complying with the requirements of s.1 of the ERA within two months of the start of their employment.
Hours of work and holidays
Although the Employment Act 1989 repealed most of the provisions restricting the hours of work of "young persons" (persons over school-leaving age but under 18 years old), this area is now affected by the EC Working Time Directive (No.93/104) and the EC Young Workers Directive (No.94/33), which make detailed provision for the regulation of working time, daily and weekly rest breaks and other matters.
The Government has recently published draft Regulations to implement both the Working Time Directive and aspects of the Young Workers Directive, and aims to have these in force by 1 October 1998. The draft regulations will be examined in detail in a forthcoming issue of IRLB.
Paid time off
The entitlement of non-employed trainees to reasonable paid time off without deductions from normal allowance rates is prescribed by individual TECs. Paid time off may be allowed for study; examinations and assessments; advice on further training or education; job interviews; court attendance; periods of training with Reserve and Cadet Forces; compassionate leave; antenatal care; and where an ongoing industrial dispute involving the trainee prevents effective or safe training.
The procedures for non-employed trainees to follow in the event of absence due to sickness, in terms of self-certification and doctor's certificates, are required to be clearly explained to the trainee.
Grievance and disciplinary procedures
Trainees must have access to clear written grievance and disciplinary procedures and they should be treated fairly and reasonably under these procedures. Trainees should be able to have a friend, trade union representative or someone else with them at any meeting. There may also be provision in the training agreement for referral of a grievance or disciplinary matter to the relevant TEC or to the Careers Service once internal procedures have been exhausted.
Health and safety
The EC Young Workers Directive aims to ensure the strict regulation and protection of young people at work; working conditions suited to their age; and protection against economic exploitation and work harmful to their health and safety. Its health and safety provisions have been implemented in Great Britain by the Health and Safety (Young Persons) Regulations 19971 which amend the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 19922.
The 1992 Regulations imposed a requirement upon employers to have regard to the special risks posed to the health and safety of young and inexperienced workers when carrying out their risk assessments. The 1997 Regulations now require that a risk assessment must first be made or, if one has already been made, should be reviewed, before an employer takes on a young person. This should take into particular account specified risks to the health and safety of young people. The Regulations also prohibit certain kinds of work for young people, including work beyond their physical or psychological capacity; work involving harmful exposure to radiation, agents which chronically affect human health or the risk of accidents to young people; and work in which there is a risk to health from extreme cold or heat, noise or vibration.
TECs include suitable clauses in their agreements with training providers covering all necessary health and safety requirements. These may provide that training providers: do not expose trainees to risks to their health and safety; provide proper training and supervision at all times; and endeavour to eliminate and control all possible hazards involved in their work through the use of safety procedures or equipment. Trainees are also themselves placed under a duty to obey safety rules and not to endanger other people's health and safety.
DISCRIMINATION
Equality of opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment for trainees is a condition of the contract between TECs and training providers. Discrimination against trainees on the grounds of sex, race and disability is also prohibited by virtue of the application to them of the provisions of ss.6(1) and 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (the SDA); ss.4(1) and (2) of the Race Relations Act 1976 (the RRA) and ss.4(1) and (2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
Sections 14 of the SDA and 13 of the RRA outlaw discrimination by training providers and subcontractors other than employers. These provisions apply to persons who provide, or make arrangements for the provision of, facilities for vocational training. It is unlawful for such a person to discriminate against a person "seeking or undergoing training which would help fit [him or] her for any employment"; in the terms of access to or provision of facilities concerned with the training; by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford access to the training; by terminating the training; or by subjecting him or her to any detriment during the course of training.
Discriminatory training
There are provisions in both the SDA and the RRA permitting positive discrimination in limited circumstances in favour of members of one sex or of a particular racial group in relation to access to training.
Section 35 of the RRA permits discrimination in favour of members of a particular racial group who have "special needs ... in regard to their education, training or welfare."
Section 37 of the RRA permits discriminatory training programmes which afford only persons of a particular racial group access to training to help fit them for particular work. It must appear to the person providing the training that, during the preceding 12 months:
Section 37 is designed to cover positive action by training organisations and does not permit positive discrimination in favour of employees (s.37(3)).
However, s.38 of the RRA does permit employers to discriminate in favour of members of a particular racial group in relation to access to facilities for training for particular work at a particular establishment. One of the following conditions must have been satisfied at some time within the preceding 12 months:
The equivalent provisions to ss.37 and 38 of the RRA in relation to permissible single-sex training can be found, respectively, in ss.47 and 48 of the SDA. Section 47 permits special training programmes for women (or men, as the case may be) if at any time within the preceding 12 months there were no women, or comparatively few women, doing some particular kind of work in Great Britain, or in an area within Great Britain. In addition, s.47(3) specifically provides that a person may put on special training programmes, or give preferential treatment for ordinary training programmes, to "persons [who] are in special need of training by reason of the period for which they have been discharging domestic or family responsibilities to the exclusion of regular full-time employment."
Section 48 of the SDA provides that an employer may provide training for female employees (or, as the case may be, male employees) only, where at any time in the preceding 12 months there have been comparatively few (if any) persons of that sex among those doing the particular work in question in its employment.
Lone parents
Under s.8 of the Employment Act 1989, the Secretary of State may by order provide that special treatment afforded to lone parents in connection with their participation in specified training schemes will not give rise to discrimination against married persons contrary to the SDA. This provision was introduced to counter the decision of the EAT in Training Commission v Jackson, which upheld a complaint by a married woman with children on the ground that she had been denied childcare allowances under the Employment Training scheme which would have been available to a single parent.
Two Orders have so far been made under s.8: the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Exemption of Special Treatment for Lone Parents) Order 19893 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Exemption of Special Treatment for Lone Parents) Order 19914.
CONTRACTS OF APPRENTICESHIP
The traditional contract of apprenticeship is a distinct type of contract recognised under the common law, and subject to certain special rules. A contract of apprenticeship involves an undertaking on the part of the employer to instruct and teach the apprentice a craft, trade or profession over a specified period of time and to maintain the apprentice during the apprenticeship. The apprentice agrees to serve the employer and to learn from him or her. The primary purpose of the contract must be training rather than work (Wiltshire Police Authority v Wynn ), and the contract must be in writing and signed by both parties.
A contract of apprenticeship falls within the statutory definition of "contract of employment" (s.230(1) ERA - see above). and so traditional apprentices are entitled to the full panoply of statutory employment rights applicable to "employees" under the ERA and other statutes.
In Wallace v CA Roofing Services Ltd, the High Court recently reconsidered the legal nature of contracts of apprenticeship. Mr Justice Sedley said that the ordinary law in regard to dismissal does not apply. A contract of apprenticeship is for a fixed term and cannot be lawfully terminated before expiry of that term. Although a contract of apprenticeship can be brought to an end by some frustrating event or repudiatory act, it is not terminable at will as a contract of employment is at common law. For example, said Sedley J, a contract of apprenticeship may be brought to an end if the employer's business is so changed that it cannot properly teach the apprentice the trade, business or profession that was intended to be taught. But that result would not follow if the employer's new business were such that it could still teach the apprentice what it had originally bound itself to teach.
On the facts of Wallace, the High Court upheld a breach of contract claim brought by a trainee sheet-metal worker, who was dismissed for redundancy before completing his training. Sedley J concluded that it is not open to an employer to terminate a "true" contract of apprenticeship, before the fixed period of the apprenticeship expires, solely on the ground of redundancy falling short of complete closure or a fundamental change in the character of the employer's enterprise.
A wrongfully dismissed apprentice can claim damages not only for loss of earnings but also a sum in respect of the value of his or her loss of future prospects as a qualified person, assuming that he or she had been able to complete the apprenticeship (Dunk v George Waller & Son Ltd).
In Wallace, Sedley J observed that "the announcement of the demise of the apprenticeship is exaggerated." Having clearly identified the legal characteristics of apprenticeship, he expressed the view that the word "apprenticeship" will ordinarily carry those connotations in fields of employment where apprenticeships are still commonly found. Moreover, Sedley J also recognised that, whatever label the parties attach to the relationship, it may raise a presumption of apprenticeship if the necessary criteria are fulfilled - that is, a fixed-term contract with the primary purpose of training.
UNFAIR DISMISSAL
An employed trainee who is dismissed (within the meaning of s.95(a)-(c) of the ERA) is entitled to complain of unfair dismissal if he or she meets the necessary qualifying conditions. Unless the claim is one of automatically unfair dismissal for an inadmissible reason (see ss.99-105 of the ERA), a minimum of two years' continuous employment is required. The employer is required to show the reason or principal reason for dismissal, and that this was one of the potentially fair reasons permitted by s.98(1)(b) and (2) of the ERA: capability or qualifications; conduct; redundancy; contravention of statutory duty or restriction; or "some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held" ("SOSR").
If the employer succeeds in showing a potentially fair reason, the industrial tribunal will go on to consider whether the dismissal is fair or unfair having regard to that reason. This "depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee" and is "determined in accordance with the equity and the substantial merits of the case" (s.98(4) of the ERA).
Some other substantial reason
Many unfair dismissal claims by trainees are likely to arise in the context of fixed-term training contracts. The expiry of a fixed-term contract containing a significant training element will normally be classified as an SOSR dismissal. In Marks v Kings College Hospital Medical School, for example, the EAT held that the expiry and non-renewal of the applicant's fixed-term contract, on the basis that the medical school's training policy was that employees at the applicant's grade were only exceptionally employed for more than four years, was an SOSR reason, and the dismissal was fair in the circumstances. Alternatively, the non-renewal was fair in the circumstances on the ground of the applicant's incapacity.
The expiry of a traditional contract of apprenticeship contract is also likely to be treated as an SOSR dismissal. In Small v Lexmead Southampton, an industrial tribunal held that the reason the employer did not offer the apprentice employment as a journeyman or tradesman after the expiry of his apprenticeship was dissatisfaction with his capability: "That was not, however, the reason for his dismissal. He was dismissed because his fixed-term contract had expired 'without being renewed under the same contract'. Even if [the employer] had employed him as a trained fitter after the expiration of his apprenticeship, he would still have been dismissed, because employment as a tradesman would not have been renewal of his fixed term 'under the same contract'."
Fairness
When it comes to applying the "reasonableness" test under s.98(4) of the ERA, it will generally be appropriate for the tribunal to have regard to the age, length of service and experience, level of training and attitude to training of the applicant; and, in appropriate cases, whether the employer adopted fair procedures, such as warnings, consultation, and consideration of alternative employment.
The fact that a trainee knows from the outset that employment is intended to be for a specific period only will be a relevant, but not determinative, factor. In Cohen v London Borough of Barking, a trainee educational psychologist was employed on a one-year contract. It was anticipated that she would arrange to undertake the final stage of her training in order to obtain full qualification as a psychologist. When she was unsuccessful in gaining a place on the relevant training course, the employer decided not to retain her either as a trainee or as an employee. The tribunal held that her dismissal was fair. The employer had weighed matters in the balance and validly reached a conclusion "as to what was best in the general interest".
Particular problems arise in seeking to establish that the expiry and non-renewal of a traditional apprenticeship contract amounts to an unfair dismissal. In Small (above), the tribunal held that the employer acted reasonably in allowing the apprentice's contract to expire without renewal under the same contract. There was, it was said, "no reason to grant him further indentures of apprenticeship for a further term. It may well be that the legislature intended that where an apprentice's contract expires, that is a dismissal and cannot give rise to a complaint of unfair dismissal, because one cannot envisage circumstances under which an apprentice would be taken on for another term as apprentice."
The EAT subsequently described this approach as "impeccable and the reasoning unassailable" in the redundancy payments case of North East Coast Shiprepairers Ltd v Secretary of State for Employment. Mr Justice Phillips described a fixed-term contract of apprenticeship as a "once-in-a-lifetime agreement" which, by its nature, precludes renewal: "Similar difficulties can arise upon the expiry of any fixed-term contract, though the acute difficulty will only arise when the fixed-term contract is of such a kind that by its nature it will not be renewed ... it may seem to be a hard result, but on reflection it can be seen that it may well have been the intention of Parliament that there should be neither a right to a redundancy payment nor a right to compensation for unfair dismissal, in cases where the matter complained of was limited to a failure by the employers to re-employ the claimant under a contract of employment different from that which had come to an end."
It therefore seems that, in cases of expiry of an apprenticeship contract where the apprentice is refused further employment, there can be no right to a redundancy payment - because the apprentice will never in fact have been employed in the capacity which he or she claims to be redundant (that is, as a qualified tradesperson) - and no right to compensation for unfair refusal of such employment.
RECOVERY OF TRAINING COSTS
Training can be an expensive investment for employers, and they sometimes agree to fund employees' training on the understanding that the employee must pay back some or all of the training costs if they leave within a particular period of time after completing the training.
The enforcement of such reimbursement clauses in the courts is problematic, in that they may be regarded as an undue restraint on the liberty of the trainee and therefore unenforceable on grounds of public policy. In Neil v Strathclyde Regional Council, the council had agreed to pay for Ms Neil's social work studies and she, in turn, undertook in her contract of employment to remain in the service of the council for at least two years following completion of her studies. In the event of her voluntarily leaving the council before then, she agreed to refund an amount of the council's expenditure proportionate to the unexpired portion of the two-year period. In the event, Ms Neil resigned less than two years after completing her studies. When the council sought to recover the sum agreed, she argued that the agreement made it impossible for her to leave the council's employment, and was therefore an undue restraint on her liberty.
The sheriff court rejected Ms Neil's defence. The judge considered that the clause would be unenforceable only if the restriction on her freedom of action was "oppressive or servile", which was not the case. It was not impossible for Ms Neil to repay the training costs, and the contract contained no more than a reasonable restriction on her freedom of action.
However, the question of whether a provision for repayment constitutes an unreasonable restraint will depend on the individual circumstances of the case. In Electronic Data Systems Ltd v Hubble, the Court of Appeal held that it was at least arguable that an arrangement, under which an employee was obliged to pay significant sums of money over to his employer if he was dismissed for misconduct or resigned from employment within three years of completing certain company training programmes, was an unenforceable restraint of trade. The case was settled, however, before the matter was fully considered at trial. In the absence of further authority, the status of contractual clauses providing for claw-back of training expenditure remains uncertain.
In Neil, it was also argued that the repayment provision was a penalty clause, rather than a genuine pre-estimate of the damage caused to the council by Ms Neil's early departure, and was therefore unenforceable for that reason as well. When the sheriff court rejected that argument, Ms Neil appealed. The Sheriff Principal considered that the provision would be a penalty clause only if the sum stipulated was "extravagant and unconscionable" in comparison with the loss which could flow from breach of the agreement. In this case, the fact that the refund depended directly and proportionately upon how much of the minimum two-year period of service was unexpired pointed strongly to the payment being proportionate to the likely loss.
1 SI 1997/135.
2 SI 1992/2051.
3 SI 1989/2140.
4 SI 1991/2813.
Trainees: main points to note
Government training schemes: a summary
There are currently three main government-subsidised training schemes: Youth Training and Modern Apprenticeships for young people up to 25 years of age, and Training for Work for the long-term unemployed over this age group. A fourth programme - the "New Deal", also known as "Welfare to Work" - was introduced on a national scale last month (see below).
Until recently, Youth Training (YT) has been the main training route for school leavers. Launched in 1990, it is intended to lead to at least one approved qualification at or above National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) level 2, mostly at technician and craft level (for all those not classed as having special training needs). It is administered by Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) in England and Wales and Local Enterprise Councils in Scotland who enter into contracts with training providers such as employers to deliver the training.
Modern Apprenticeships (MAs) were launched nationally in 1995 to provide the same age-group with a higher-quality work-based training pitched at a qualification at or above NVQ level 3 or equivalent at technician, supervisory and similar levels. The intention was to apply the respected traditional apprenticeships in the manufacturing/engineering occupations to new service sectors of the economy such as retail, travel and tourism, childcare and banking. Unlike traditional apprenticeships, however, MAs are not time-served. MAs are jointly developed by lead TECs and training organisations for particular occupational sectors.
The previous Government had proposed to replace YT with a new scheme, National Traineeships, from September 1997. These were to be available at NVQ levels 1, 2 or 3 to provide clearer routes of progression to MAs, further education or work. The Labour administration is carrying this reform through as part of its Target 2000 programme, although not to the proposed timescale. National Traineeship programmes are being developed on a sector-by-sector basis and are gradually being phased in to replace YT. Target 2000 aims to ensure that all young people are qualified to the equivalent of NVQ level 2 by the age of 18. National Traineeships may form a part of this programme. MAs, generally regarded as being highly successful, remain largely unaffected by these new developments.
The Government's priority in the area of training, however, is its New Deal, or Welfare to Work programme. This began in January 1998 in 12 pilot areas and was extended nationwide from April 1998. Initially, the New Deal was focused on the young (those aged between 18 and 24 and unemployed for six months or more), although aspects of it are being extended to long-term unemployed adults (those aged over 25 years old and unemployed for over two years). It is administered in most areas by the Employment Service in partnership with TECs, training providers, employers, and other organisations - although, in a few areas, management has been contracted out to private sector companies. The New Deal offers specific options for young people, one of which is a full-time job plus training with a private sector employer leading to a recognised qualification. This option guarantees the equivalent of one day of training a week, and participating employers must sign an agreement to provide this training and to undertake that the job will continue after six months' subsidy unless specified exceptional circumstances apply. If this is not possible, the employer must assist in finding a new job or training. The agreement further obliges the employer to pay wages at least equal to the subsidy, although a rate comparable to that of other employees doing the same job is expected (see IRS's Employee Development Bulletin No.97 , January 1998).
CASE LIST
Cohen v London Borough of Barking [1976] IRLR 416
Daley Allied Suppliers Ltd [1983] IRLR 14
Dunk v George Walter & Son Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 630
Electronic Data Systems Ltd v Hubble 20.11.87 Court of Appeal
Lymbury t/a John Lymbury & Co v McCrery 18.2.98 EAT 217/98
Marks v Kings College Hospital Medical School 26.9.85 EAT 639/84
Massey v Crown Life Insurance Co [1978] IRLR 31
Neil v Strathclyde Regional Council [1984] IRLR 11 and 14
North East Coast Shiprepairers Ltd v Secretary of State for Employment [1978] IRLR 149
O'Kelly and others v Trusthouse Forte plc [1983] IRLR 369
Oliver v JP Malnick & Co [1983] IRLR 456
Small v Lexmead Southampton [1977] IRLR 508
Training Commission v Jackson [1990] ICR 222
Wallace v C A Roofing Services Ltd [1996] IRLR 435
Wiltshire Police Authority v Wynn [1980] ICR 649
Young & Woods Ltd v West [1980] IRLR 201
